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PUNISHING COLLECTIVE ENTITIES 
Tom R. Tyler and Avital Mentovich 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that, while the legal world treats corporate 
entities as “people” for legal purposes, this legal framing does not 
fit well with naïve models of assessing responsibility and blame. 
These difficulties raise questions about the value of treating 
entities as “people” for legal purposes just at a time when the 
United States Supreme Court seems to be moving actively to 
increase this “entity as a person” legal metaphor. 
The Article first reviews the literature on the psychology of 
responsibility and then presents both survey and experimental data 
that compares reactions to individual and organizational level 
wrongdoing. We argue that the data suggests that people have 
greater trouble holding entities responsible for wrongdoing and 
punishing them than they do making judgments of responsibility 
and endorsing punitive actions for individuals. In an era of 
corporate scandal and wrongdoing, this difficulty points to a 
problem within the law—the process of punishing corporate 
misconduct is more problematic than the process of punishing 
individual misconduct.  
I. THE LEGAL CATEGORIZATION OF ENTITIES AS INDIVIDUALS 
It is common for the law to talk about corporate entities as if 
they were people that have their own will, intentions, and goals. 
                                                          
 Tom Tyler is a University Professor at New York University who teaches in 
the Psychology Department and the Law School. 
 Avital Mentovich is a graduate of Tel Aviv University law school and 
currently a graduate student in the Psychology Department at New York 
University. 
204 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
This legal personification of corporations began in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In the initial decisions, the view of the 
corporation as a separate legal entity was developed mainly to limit 
the personal liability of stockholders and to enable the signing of 
contracts. The first ruling that effectively established the legal 
fiction of corporate personhood is the 1886 United States Supreme 
Court opinion, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Company.1 In that decision, there was no discussion of 
corporations as juristic persons, and yet, because a court reporter 
chose such language in writing the head note to the case, the 
decision is now viewed as having granted corporations 
constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (the 
amendment was originally enacted to secure due process and other 
constitutional rights to newly released slaves). 
In the decades following Santa Clara County, the Supreme 
Court continued to develop the notion that corporations enjoy the 
same protections as natural persons with very few exceptions. 
Recently, the corporate personhood doctrine captured public 
attention due to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission.2 In the landmark decision, the Court 
held that the First Amendment did not limit the right of 
corporations to actively participate in political campaigns by 
funding independent political broadcasts.3 As in the prior case 
noted, this decision invokes the idea of the corporation with the 
rights of a person. 
Legal scholars have noted that the equation of personhood and 
corporate identity that is reflected in treating entities as if they 
were individuals fits well with the prevailing legal rules, which 
were organized around person-level categories governing 
individual activity.4 It was difficult to insert a collectivity into a set 
of laws with person-based rules and conceptions.5  
As we move into an era of corporate scandal and corruption, 
                                                          
1 Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–96 (1886). 
2 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
3 Id. 
4 VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY & CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 82 (2000). 
5 Id. 
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discussions about the accountability of corporations for a series of 
actions that would be widely viewed as criminal if conducted by 
individuals have increasingly revolved around questions of 
culpability and punishment, questions that have a long history in 
the legal treatment of individual wrongdoing by people. In the 
context of dealing with issues of accountability for conduct, 
treating entities as having people-like features leads to a concern 
about when people will feel it is appropriate to punish such 
collective entities and whether their collective nature will change 
the way that people think about responsibility for conduct. This 
analysis will address this question by comparing the factors 
shaping punishment for unethical conduct linked to people and to 
groups. In particular, we will compare the reactions for unethical 
conduct by individuals and by organizations.   
This Article will address the question of whether or not 
individuals responsible for assigning the punishment for the 
wrongdoing react differently to evidence of unethical conduct 
when it is committed by an individual or by an organization. We 
suggest, based on findings in the psychology of punishment and on 
human observations of both social behaviors and wrongdoing, that 
perceptions and punishments of misconduct committed by 
organizations are inherently deficient when compared to the 
perceptions and punishments of similar misconduct perpetrated by 
an individual. The human framework for understanding 
wrongdoing is tailored to evaluate the behavior of individuals, 
within which one can easily attribute intentions, desires, and 
evaluations of character. Organizations are a more difficult target 
for moral judgments because they lack these easily ascertainable 
human aspects. To support this reasoning, we report four studies 
conducted in a variety of social settings that examine how 
individuals make judgments about the (mis)conduct of individuals 
versus organizations.  
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT 
The notion that the violation of a social rule deserves a 
punishment is fundamental to any established society. While 
societies differ widely in what rules they enact and how they 
punish those who transgress those rules, the need to punish rule 
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breaking is central to the maintenance of social order and is found 
in all societies.6 One reason that explains the astonishingly 
pervasive tradition of punishment across societies is that 
punishment is evolutionarily adaptive. Indeed, it is argued that 
punishment can serve as a learning instrument through which 
societies not only prevent negative behaviors from reoccurring 
(specific deterrence) but can also promote rule following behavior 
(general deterrence). It is worth noting, however, that, at least until 
recently, this mechanism for regulating society has evolved in a 
social environment comprised of individuals and not organizations. 
In other words, if in the course of our social evolution we 
developed the means to deal with deviant behavior by individuals 
through law and legal punishment, these means were developed to 
perceive and to punish the misconduct of individuals and not of 
groups, simply because social organizations have only recently 
been defined and protected as codified legal entities in our social 
environment. 
At the individual level, studies exploring the nature of the 
motivation to punish often link punishment to issues of retribution 
and deterrence. According to retributive justice theory, punishment 
addresses the moral outrage that people feel when they encounter a 
wrongful act. From that perspective, the punishment should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. The seriousness of 
the act is determined by the magnitude of the harm and by the 
circumstances that led the wrongdoer to cause such harm.7 
According to this model, the key issue is the character of the 
wrongdoer and his intentions when breaking a rule.8 
In contrast, deterrence theory is built on a rational choice 
                                                          
6 Neil Vidmar & Dale T. Miller, Socialpsychological Processes Underlying 
Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 565–602 
(1980). 
7 See Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do 
We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. OF 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 284–99 (2002); Kevin M. Carlsmith & 
John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, 40 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 193–236 (M. P. Zanna ed., 2008); John M. 
Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive 
Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 324–36 (2003). 
8 Darley & Pittman, supra note 71, at 326. 
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model and argues that the main purpose of punishment is 
prospective—to prevent future wrongdoing.9 From a deterrence 
perspective, the key goal of punishment is to shape the future 
behavior of the wrongdoer (specific deterrence), as well as others 
who might see their action and the subsequent punishment (general 
deterrence).10   
Studies on the motivations underlying punishment decisions 
consistently show the social and the legal importance of both 
deterrence and retribution as bases for punishment. They also show 
that individuals cite both as important considerations when 
punishing. Notwithstanding such evidence, individuals, in fact, 
make punishment decisions primarily as a function of retributive 
justice.11   
The judgment of the moral seriousness of misconduct, one that 
is of crucial importance to retributive justice concerns, relies 
heavily upon assessments of the wrongdoer’s character and intent. 
In other words, the same act that caused identical harm will carry 
different moral labels if the act was done intentionally or 
unintentionally. Some studies in the psychology of justice point out 
that intention is so integral to moral judgments that assessments of 
intent precede the evaluation of other features of the act. In other 
words, individuals first make judgments about what the actor was 
trying to do, and only after, continue in their moral appraisal of 
other aspects of the harm and of the wrongdoer.12  
Unfortunately, we do not possess access to others’ mental 
states or to the intentions that underlie their actions. Judgments 
about intent require a theory of mind, and more specifically, they 
require psychological schemas and processes through which 
people reason about others’ behavior. And, in particular, they 
require a model for inferring the moral character of another person 
                                                          
9 See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence at the Onset of the 
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 
(Michael Tonry ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998). 
10 See generally id.  
11 See supra note 7. 
12 See KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 166–67 (1985); BERNARD WEINER, 
JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL 
CONDUCT 7–8 (1995). 
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based upon information about how they have behaved in a given 
set of circumstances. In the next section, we will focus on 
psychological models and studies that explore the conceptual 
framework through which people understand social behaviors, and 
in particular, wrongdoings. As we will show, such understanding 
relies heavily on attribution processes of intent and character that 
work well when assessing individuals, but not as effectively for 
organizations.   
III. ASSESSING WRONGDOING BY INDIVIDUALS 
The classic account of individuals’ perceptions of misconduct 
is provided by the social psychologist Fritz Heider.13 Heider claims 
that humans perceive others through a conceptual framework that 
connects the behaviors and actions they observe with the 
underlying mental states they infer the individual is experiencing.14 
These inferences about the wrongdoer’s intent, motivations, and 
desire are central to reactions to wrongdoings, and are achieved 
through judgments of the perpetrator’s actions and character.15 
According to Heider, the understanding of intentional actions is 
defined in terms of the mental concepts of belief, desire, and 
intention.16 In the context of wrongdoing, this account suggests 
that perceptions of an act as wrongful are psychologically 
connected to assessments of the moral character of the actor.17 
Heider suggests that individuals approach others with the goal of 
gathering the information they need to predict the conduct of 
others not only in that moment but also in the future.18 Because 
individuals believe that traits are immutable determinants of 
behavior, knowing someone’s character is a sure way to predict the 
nature of his or her future actions.19  
Heider demonstrated the centrality of character assessments to 
                                                          
13 See generally FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS (1958). 
14 See HEIDER, supra note 13, at 20–58.  
15 See id. at 79–124. 
16 See generally HEIDER, supra note 13. 
17 See generally id.  
18 See generally id.  
19 See generally id.  
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punishment when he formulated a five-level model that shows the 
connection between causing a crime and being punished for it.20 At 
level four of his model, which he calls purposive commission, 
people are held responsible for events that they intend to cause.21 
Unsurprisingly, this level encapsulates the central dimension of 
legal reasoning.22 At level five, the most sophisticated level of the 
model, however, Heider articulates that a person’s punishment  
depends not only upon what they intend but also upon situational 
factors.23 For example, a person would be deemed less responsible 
for the wrongful act if a person’s family were held hostage and he 
or she is compelled by the hostage taker to rob a bank in order to 
secure the family’s release.  
In stages one through three of the model, Heider argues that 
individuals often infer responsibility on lesser grounds, i.e., in spite 
of a lack of intent.24 The most legally relevant example of this 
deduction is careless commission, or when people are held 
responsible for outcomes that they should have anticipated would 
occur due to their actions. So, if a person were to leave the keys in 
his or her car and a teenager steals the car and crashes into another, 
the person might be held responsible because he or she should 
have anticipated that such a consequence might occur. Drinking 
and driving is another example of careless commission because a 
drunken driver does not necessarily intend to cause harm, but is 
often viewed as responsible for his or her diminished capacity to 
act competently. While Heider’s model is complex, its meaning 
and relevance for this discussion are simple—individuals view 
inferences about both character and intent as central to holding 
someone responsible for his or her actions and for punishing the 
wrongdoing.25 
In other words, when trying to understand others’ behavior, 
individuals rely heavily on personality-based attributions and the 
perception process through which people try to distinguish the 
                                                          
20 See generally id.  
21 See generally id. 
22 See generally id. 
23 See generally id. 
24 See generally id.  
25 See generally id. 
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personality component of behavior from those aspects of behavior 
caused by the situation. Heider also suggests that people do not do 
this with complete accuracy. Instead they under weigh the forces 
of the situation. This phenomenon is called the “fundamental 
attribution error”—the tendency when judging the actions of a 
person to put too little weight upon the role of the situation relative 
to the weight that the situation actually has in causing the behavior. 
The fundamental attribution error is shown to exist across a variety 
of societies in numerous situations.  
With regard to misconduct and according to the fundamental 
attribution error, individuals are more likely to believe that bad 
acts are committed by bad people rather than bad actions are the 
result of bad situations. Such inferences indicate that when it 
comes to forming judgments of others, individuals are easily 
convinced that behavior is a reflection of the target’s character and, 
as a consequence, that the target is then worthy of either praise or 
blame. 
IV. ASSESSING WRONGDOING BY ENTITIES 
The Heiderian model of social perception works well for 
individuals, but may not be sufficient to account for perceptions of 
groups or organizations. In the case of collective entities, 
individuals cannot use the traditional model of person perception 
that entails: first, inferring character and through that inference, 
then, forming assessments of blame, and finally, punishing 
wrongful actions. Without the ability to evaluate individual 
dispositions, in other words, people may have difficulty reacting to 
wrongdoing.   
Hans addresses the issue of responsibility directly in an 
analysis of corporate wrongdoing.26 The focus of her work is on 
judgments of wrongdoing made by observers, particularly jurors, 
and she questions whether jurors differentially assess the 
accountability of business corporations and individual plaintiffs.27 
Her analysis of juries suggests that juror views of corporations 
                                                          
26 See generally HANS, supra note 4. 
27 Id. at 82. 
 Punishing Collective Entities 211 
were “less concrete” than their views of individual plaintiffs.28 
Specifically, corporations (as non-people) cannot testify in court, 
and in her study were instead represented by managers of varying 
levels of seniority.29 Hence, jurors “had little basis on which to 
generate detailed evaluations and inferences about their behavior 
and character, which were so obvious in jurors’ assessments of the 
plaintiffs.”30 Hans also cites psychological research that indicates 
that individuals view people in fundamentally different ways than 
groups.31 In discussing the psychological tendency to form global 
judgments when considering individuals but not when considering 
collective entities, she notes:  
We expect that an individual will have a stable personality, 
and as we listen to him or her speak we work to form an 
integrated, global judgment about what that person is like. 
In contrast, most of us do not expect that individuals who 
are part of a group (such as a business corporation) are 
going to behave in consistent ways, and therefore we are 
less motivated to form a global impression of a group.32  
Finally, Hans suggests that jurors try to find appropriate human 
analogies when addressing questions of corporate responsibility for 
wrongdoing.33 Jurors, she argues, find it helpful to think of 
corporations as people.34 After her careful review of the relevant 
evidence, Hans suggests that jurors often hold corporations to a 
higher standard than individual plaintiffs by judging the 
corporations to be more negligent than individual persons when 
presented with the same set of facts.35 In summarizing her 
conclusion, Hans states: “[A]lthough the actions of a person and a 
corporation are evaluated using much the same criteria, more is 
expected of a reasonable corporation than a reasonable person.”36 
                                                          
28 Id. at 84. 
29 Id. at 82. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 84–85. 
32 Id. at 82. 
33 Id. at 85. 
34 Id. at 82. 
35 See id. at 114. 
36 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 278 
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Ultimately, these elevated expectations, she argues, translate into 
greater liability for corporations.37   
Hans’ conclusions would appear to contradict the proposed 
thesis of this Article, whose claim is that a lack of personified 
elements in organizations makes them more difficult targets for 
moral judgments. It is worth noting, however, that even Hans’ 
account describes the difficulty faced by jurors attempting to draw 
inferences about the intentions and motivations underlying 
organizational behavior.  
This Article suggests that when the focus is upon crimes in 
which moral turpitude is more central, such as lying and stealing, 
and for which issues of character and intention are especially 
central, people may look at individual versus corporate culpability 
differently than they did with the cases studied by Hans. 
V. PERSONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY 
Within an alternative framework more relevant to crimes of 
serious moral wrongdoing, Darley discusses the motivations 
underlying assessments of wrongdoing by entities.38 He does so in 
an analysis of social organization “and the production of evil.”39 
Darley suggests that everyday thinking about evil requires a link 
between it and elements of intent such that those who commit evil 
acts are perceived as necessarily and intrinsically possessing the 
quality of evilness in their character.40  
The Darley argument suggests that people have trouble 
accepting that situational factors can promote actions that might be 
classified as evil.41 For example, in the famous Milgram study, 
participants delivered lethal levels of electric shock to another 
person.42 According to Darley, it is more difficult for people to 
                                                          
(2007). 
37 See HANS, supra note 4, at 112–37. 
38 See John M. Darley, Social Organization for the Production of Evil, 3 
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 199, 204–06, 211 (1992) [hereinafter Darley, Social 
Organization]. 
39 See id. at 204. 
40 See id. at 200–01. 
41 See id. at 207, 217. 
42 See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1975) 
 Punishing Collective Entities 213 
conceive of situational forces as being “evil” than to believe that a 
person possesses an inherently evil character.43 Hence, they made 
character inferences about the person delivering harm and 
underemphasized the role of the situation in creating the behavior. 
Similarly, Arendt pinpoints the difficulty of labeling 
organizational forces as the true root cause of evil when 
articulating her great disappointment at the recognition that Adolf 
Eichman was not a “monster,” but instead, an ordinary person 
caught up in evil bureaucratic forces.44 Eichman, in Arendt’s 
amended view, was so focused on efficiency in performing his job 
that he could execute it without much consideration of the 
consequences resulting from its fulfillment—there was limited 
reflection upon whether his job involved shipping people to their 
deaths or shipping some other commodity to a market.45 
Arendt’s framing of someone widely viewed as a mass 
murderer as instead a mindless bureaucrat makes it more difficult 
to understand how to punish Eichmann’s wrongdoing because our 
notion of serious immorality requires us to have a seriously 
immoral (i.e., evil) actor to hold responsible and punish for their 
actions.46 Relatedly, Kelman and Hamilton discuss the need for an 
evil actor in order to identify evil when analyzing the My Lai 
massacre of civilians by US troops in Vietnam.47 Condemning this 
evil action required identifying an evil actor.48 And so, Lieutenant 
Calley, the on-site commander was held responsible for the 
massacre,49 even though the evil actions at My Lai arguably could 
be viewed as resulting from situational forces such as the more 
remote and less clearly specified high authorities for whom he 
                                                          
(explaining the findings of Milgram’s experiment that individuals are willing to 
obey authority despite their own personal discomfort performing the assigned 
task). 
43 See Darley, Social Organization, supra note 38, at 203–04. 
44 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL 18 (1963). 
45 Id. at 22. 
46 Id. at 120–22. 
47 See generally HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF 
OBEDIENCE (1989). 
48 See generally id. 
49 See generally id. 
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worked. From these examples, we come to see that evil actions 
require a bad actor to be easily identified and punished for his/her 
evilness. 
VI. PERSONALIZING RESPONSIBILITY 
Why might responsibility be allocated differently between 
individuals and organizations? Psychology research argues that 
individuals are motivated to personalize responsibility by finding 
an individual to hold singularly accountable for complex events. 
After events like Pearl Harbor or the September 11 attack on the 
United States, commissions formed and investigations ensued that 
were motivated by the need to assign responsibility for the harm. 
Research suggests that people are especially motivated to assign 
responsibility to either an irresponsible, negligent, or evil person. 
This is likely because blaming a person is more psychologically 
fulfilling than blaming an impersonal set of organizational or 
situational forces. Identifying a person whose actions (or inaction) 
led to the disaster brings psychological satisfaction. We do not 
need to experience a major societal disaster for such motivations to 
be activated, however. Heider argues that lower impact events like 
a crime wave in a community motivate people to cast a broad net 
in their efforts to identify someone to hold accountable for the 
crimes.50 This can be reflected in community actions such as 
punishing suspected wrongdoers via mob action, with only the 
most tenuous link between the suspect and the crimes. When there 
is a serious crime people “require” a culprit in the sense that they 
are uneasy unless they can feel that the person responsible has 
been found and punished. 
Feigenson advances the idea of personalization when he 
discusses motivations for holding people responsible in the context 
of accidents.51 He suggests that: “When people use their common 
sense to think about responsibility for accidents, they tend to think 
                                                          
50 See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOL. OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 81–82 
(1958). 
51 NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK & TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS 89 (2000). 
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in simplified, personalized, moralized, and dichotomized terms.”52 
According to Feigenson, individuals are motivated to focus on the 
characteristics of the person responsible for the accident and to 
“understand accidents in terms of personality-driven 
melodramas.”53 He further suggests that blaming people simplifies 
the assignment of responsibility and diverts attention from more 
complex social and systemic causes of accidents.54 Ultimately, he 
concludes: “Melodramatic blaming supports a culture of 
individualism.55 It offers us a world in which human agency is 
responsible for bad outcomes, and in which responsibility for those 
outcomes is assigned to the people (the bad guys) who deviate 
from accepted behavioral norms.”56   
Several psychological studies, some of which were presented 
in the symposium leading to this volume, show that the flexibility 
of human perception allows us, under certain conditions, to view 
groups and organizations in unified terms, and to attribute 
intentions, drives, goals, and even traits to them. Thus, we are 
capable of personifying groups, especially when we assess 
cohesive and homogenous groups. This Article in particular argues 
that this capacity to personalize is inherently more limited when it 
comes to groups versus individuals—we simply are better at 
assessing character and intentions when evaluating people than 
organizations.  We focus on the psychological reasons that people 
blame people and organizations differently when reacting to 
similar types and levels of conduct. 
VII. SUMMARY OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
The prior literature suggests that assigning responsibility to a 
person comes more naturally than assessing the accountability of 
collective entities. Consequently, individuals are inclined to 
personalize complex problems to facilitate the formation of moral 
judgments. This phenomenon is further supported by the tendency 
                                                          
52 Id.  
53 See FEIGENSON, supra note 51, at 88, 212–13. 
54 Id. at 213. 
55 Id. at 213–14. 
56 See generally FEIGENSON, supra note 51. 
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of jurors to use personified analogies for corporations when 
reasoning about the moral accountability of such collective 
entities. 
In addition, people may hold different standards for judging the 
conduct of corporations. Hans provides the most direct evidence of 
this by arguing that individuals hold corporations to higher 
standards because they believe corporations to be more competent 
and knowledgeable “people” that should be more responsible in 
their conduct.57 
Our goal is to examine the question of how people think about 
responsibility when considering people and groups. In particular, 
we will examine whether inferences about motive and character 
are more central to evaluations of people than entities. And, we 
will investigate whether this tendency leads to a weakening of the 
attributed link between conduct and responsibility. 
In addition, our focus is on the evaluations made by individuals 
who are internal to the organization. Hans, as discussed above, 
considered juror evaluations of companies. But, this set of 
judgments necessarily reflects the assessments of outsiders. The 
views of insiders are also important. Insiders are those who might 
potentially call attention to wrongful conduct by whistleblowing or 
by working internally to stop unethical practices. Furthermore, 
they are important to corporate culture and can send a message to 
the company by resisting, undermining, or ignoring practices they 
view as unethical. For these reasons, we will focus on the 
judgments made by those within an entity, in this case, a business 
corporation. 
VIII. ACCEPTING DECISIONS MADE BY PEOPLE OR INSTITUTIONS 
The core of our argument is that people react differently to 
similar conduct by individuals versus groups and organizations. 
We will first consider this issue using a sample of employees 
drawn from a corporation. The issue we will consider is: Why do 
employees accept directives given to them within a work setting? 
Those directives can come either from a person or from an entity. 
This study is concerned with employee judgments of conduct 
                                                          
57 HANS, supra note 4, at 112–38. 
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within their own company, and not with outsider evaluations of the 
company. We focus on this issue because many elements of 
wrongful conduct involve the acceptance of directives that could 
potentially be questioned by employees. If employees raise 
questions about or even disregard policies because they view them 
as inappropriate or immoral this can be an important check on 
questionable conduct by their work organizations. 
The first study we conducted is based upon interviews with 
employees at a large multinational financial services company. 
Employees within the private banking division of this company 
received a questionnaire via interoffice mail that assessed various 
aspects of their organizational attitudes and behaviors.58 The study 
focused on two possible employee reactions to managerial 
practices: an unwillingness to defer to an individual and an 
unwillingness to defer to a group. Individuals make decisions, 
while entities make policies. When people have concerns about 
either, however, they can express an unwillingness to accept them, 
and this Article is concerned with their reasons for doing so. In 
particular, our concern is with an employee’s lack of feelings of 
obligation and responsibility to defer that may be the result of 
employee concerns about practices occurring in their workplace. 
The underlying assumption in both cases is that people typically 
feel some responsibility to accept decisions from superiors and to 
follow organizational policies. But they may express an 
unwillingness to defer under conditions in which those policies 
seem wrong. 
We are interested in the different reasons people have for 
refusing to defer to a person or to an entity.59 In particular, we 
                                                          
58 Surveys were sent to 1,350 bankers. They were returned directly to the 
authors of this Article in enclosed business reply envelopes. Employees were 
permitted to complete the survey while at work and were assured confidentiality 
by both the investigators and the organization’s management. A total of 540 
surveys were returned, representing a 40% response rate. 
59 To measure deference in the case of supervisors, employees were asked 
to agree or disagree with the following statement: “[a]n employee should accept 
the decisions made by their supervisor, even if they think they are wrong;” 
“[d]isobeying one’s supervisor is seldom justified;” “[s]omeone who disregards 
their supervisor’s decisions hurts their work group;” and “[w]ork organizations 
are most effective when people follow the directives of their supervisors.” For 
the company, the questions were: “[r]espect for an organization’s rules is an 
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argue that inferences about motivations should matter more with a 
person than with an entity. In line with the arguments already 
made, making motive inferences and judgments of character is a 
person-level issue, and we think that it is easier to engage in this 
assessment with a person than with an organization. 
We will contrast three sets of judgments about the properties of 
a person and of an organization. The attributes that might be 
important for either are: neutrality,60 quality of treatment,61 and 
inferences about motivations/character.62 To examine the link 
                                                          
important value for employees to have;” “[i]n the long run, the organization is 
better off if workers willing[ly] follow the rules;” “[i]t is difficult to break the 
rules often and keep one’s self respect;” and “[p]eople should support the 
policies of their work organizations.” 
60 The items measuring supervisor quality of decision making were: “[m]y 
supervisor’s decisions are consistent across people and situations;” “[m]y 
supervisor’s decisions are made based upon facts, not their personal biases and 
opinions;” and “[m]y supervisor’s decisions are equally fair to everyone.”  The 
items measuring company decision making were: “The rules call for equal 
treatment of all employees;” “[t]he rules dictate that decisions should be fair and 
unbiased;” “[t]he rules and procedures are applied consistently across people 
and situations;” “[t]he rules ensure that decisions are made based upon facts, not 
personal biases and opinions;” and “[t]he rules and procedures are equally fair to 
everyone.” 
61 The items measuring supervisor quality of treatment were: “[m]y 
supervisor respects my rights as an employee;” “[m]y supervisor respects my 
rights as a person;” “[m]y supervisor treats me with dignity;” and [m]y 
supervisor treats me with respect.” The items measuring company quality of 
treatment were: “[t]he rules respect my rights as an employee;” “[t]he rules 
respect my rights as a person;” “I am treated with dignity by my company;” and 
“I am treated politely by my company.” 
62 The items measuring supervisor character were: “[m]y supervisor 
follows through on the promises he/she makes;” “[m]y supervisor usually gives 
me an honest explanation for the decisions he/she makes;” and “[m]y supervisor 
takes my needs into account when making decisions;” “I trust my supervisor to 
do what is best for me;” and “[m]y supervisor listens to me when I express my 
views.” The items measuring companies “character” were: “[t]he rules require 
that I get an honest explanation for how decisions are made;” “[t]he company 
follows through on the promises it makes;” “[m]y views are considered when 
the rules are being applied;” “[t]he rules ensure that my needs will be taken into 
account;” and “I trust the company to do what is best for me.” See Tom R. Tyler 
& Avital Mentovich, Multinational Financial Services Employee Survey (July 
2010, study on file with authors).   
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between reasons for action and the legitimacy of 
supervisors/organizations we looked at the role of decision 
making, quality of treatment, and character inferences upon 
legitimacy.63  
An examination of the reasons that corporate employees have 
for granting or withholding legitimacy to their supervisor and their 
company supports our suggestion that people focus most strongly 
upon character inferences when they are dealing with particular 
people. As Table 1 shows, employees consider inferences about 
the motivations of their supervisor, but not about the motivations 
of management, when they are making legitimacy judgments. In 
the case of the individual supervisor, inferences about the 
supervisor’s motivations were the key factor shaping judgments 
about legitimacy, while for the organization it was the neutrality of 
the decision-making rules. 
 
Table 1.  The antecedents of employee willingness to defer. 
 
 Legitimacy 
of policies 
Legitimacy 
of supervisor 
 
Neutrality of decision making 
 
0.26*** 
 
-.16 
 
Quality of interpersonal treatment of 
employees 
 
-.08 
 
-.06 
 
Inferences about motivations behind 
decisions 
 
0.03 
 
0.32** 
 
Adjusted R.-sq. 
 
8% 
 
5% 
 
Of course, legitimacy is not directly on point for this Article 
because it is not about punishment. It is about accountability, 
however, since legitimacy is measured in terms of an obligation to 
defer. So, if people feel responsible for following directives, they 
                                                          
63 Legitimacy refers to the belief among employees that they ought to 
accept and defer to the decisions of organizational authorities because it is 
appropriate for those leaders to make decisions concerning what employees and 
the company should do. 
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will not object to or otherwise undermine the authority, 
irrespective of whether that authority is a person or an institution. 
A. Research on Employee Reactions to Wrongdoing in a 
Sample of Employees 
As noted above, the first study does not directly examine 
punishment. The second study focuses on employees, which allows 
for a more direct measure of punishment. The second study 
examines the behavior of employees reacting to the actions of their 
supervisors and corporate entities.64 Our particular concern is with 
differences in reactions to the same ethically related judgments 
about people (supervisors) versus corporate entities. Two 
employee reactions are considered: a willingness to defer and 
behavior to undermine/punish authorities. 
B. Questionnaire 
Employees were asked to evaluate two entities: “your 
supervisor” and “your company and its formal rules and 
procedures.” Identical questions were used to evaluate the ethical 
character of the conduct of each employee’s supervisor and their 
work organization. Ethical character included motive inferences, 
but also asked about the ethicality of behavior and the provision of 
opportunities for correction. Three questions were used to assess 
                                                          
64 Participants in the second study are a random sample drawn from a 
national panel of respondents designed to be representative of the entire United 
States population. Members of this national panel, which is maintained by a for-
profit private organization, are initially contacted for their participation via 
random digit dialing. An incentive of free Internet access via WebTV is 
provided to all those that join the panel, and all surveys administered to the 
panel are conducted over WebTV (for more details on the panel, please contact 
the authors). 
    All potential respondents for the current study were screened to ensure that 
they worked at least 20 hours a week, had a primary supervisor, and had worked 
at their current employer for at least 3 months. Respondents meeting these 
criteria completed the survey in two parts, one week apart. In total, there were 
4,430 employee respondents in the sample. 
    This is data that was collected by and is on file with the authors.   
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three aspects of ethical conduct: ethicality, trustworthiness, and 
correctability. To assess ethicality, employees were asked whether 
the conduct is “consistent with your views regarding appropriate 
ethical standards.” To evaluate trustworthiness employees were 
asked whether the conduct “reflect[s] a desire to do what is best for 
employees like yourself.” And, to assess correctability, employees 
are asked whether the authority “[p]rovide[s] you opportunities to 
appeal decisions that you disagree with.” Employees responded to 
each question on a five point scale, with “1” indicating strongly 
disagree and “5” indicating strongly agree. Distinct scales were 
created for supervisor (alpha = 0.87) and company (alpha = 0.89). 
C. Findings 
An examination of the average level of ethical conduct for 
supervisors and companies suggests that employees see 
supervisors as being more ethical than the company. The average 
for employees’ supervisors was 3.25 (standard deviation = 1.05) 
while the average for companies was 3.21 (1.09), which is a 
significant difference (t(4430) = 2.96, p < .01).  Both averages are 
somewhat positive on a 1–5 scale with 2.5 as the midpoint. 
D. Do these differences matter? 
The key issue is whether it matters if the ethicality involves a 
person or an entity. To address this question, we examined the 
influence of ethicality upon behavior. Two behaviors were of 
concern. The first involved actions taken against the company 
and/or one’s supervisor, actions that we will refer to as “punishing 
behavior.”65 Conversely, we were concerned with an employee’s 
                                                          
65 Employees were asked to assess the overall level of punishing behavior 
they directed at their supervisor and company as a group, using questions with a 
response scale ranging from 1 “never” to 7 “always.” The question was: “[h]ow 
often do you . . . not do your best work because you are angry at your supervisor 
or the organization you work for.” The mean was 1.80 (1.29) on a scale ranging 
from 1 “never” to 7 “always,” which means employees rarely engaged in 
punishing behavior. 
     Punishing one’s supervisor was measured by the frequency of engaging in 
two types of behavior. Respondents were asked how often they: “[f]ind ways to 
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willingness to follow directives, i.e., acceptance.66 
A further examination considered the influence of ethics upon 
compliance with company rules and the decisions of supervisors. 
The question is whether ethical conduct helps. This analysis is 
shown in Table 2. Again, ethical evaluations were more influential 
in shaping the reactions of employees to their supervisor than to 
their company. In this case the beta weight for the company is 0.12 
and for supervisors is 0.22. In other words, employees put almost 
twice as much weight upon character when deciding whether to 
defer to individual decisions. 
What about impact upon conduct, i.e., does unethical conduct 
hurt either a person or an entity? First, what about behavior 
designed to punish either one’s supervisor or the company? We 
examined the influence of judgments about ethical conduct on 
punishing behavior. The results of an analysis focused upon 
punishment are shown in Table 3.   
In the case of general punishment reactions, both evaluations of 
the supervisor and the company have an influence of 
                                                          
undermine your supervisor?” and “[n]eglect to follow work rules or the 
instructions of your supervisor?” These items were used to create a scale (mean 
= 1.65; 0.93: alpha = 0.58). 
     Punishing one’s company was measured by frequency of engaging in three 
types of behavior. Respondents were asked how often they: “[t]ake supplies 
from work without permission?;” “[c]ome in late to work without permission?;” 
and “[s]lack off towards the end of the day?” The items were used to create a 
scale (mean = 1.97; 0.99; alpha = 0.60). 
66 Accepting company rules was measured using five items, each of which 
measured how often employees complied with rules. The items were: “how 
often do you” “[c]omply with organizational rules and regulations?;” “[u]se 
company rules to guide what you do on the job?;” “[s]eek information about 
appropriate company policies before acting?;” “[c]ome to work on time?;” and 
“[f]ollow organizational rules about how you should spend your time?” The 
scale had a mean of 5.85 (0.94). 
     Accepting the instructions of one’s supervisor was measured using four 
items, each of which measured how often the employee did as instructed. The 
items were: “how often do you” “[f]ollow the directives of your supervisor?;” 
“[f]ollow the policies established by your supervisor?;” “[c]arefully carry out the 
instructions of your supervisor?;” and “[a]dhere to the directives of your 
supervisor?” The items ranged from 1 “never” to 7 “always.” The scale had a 
mean of 6.19 (0.84). Id.  
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approximately equal magnitude. However, when we look at 
targeted behavior, differences emerge. Employees are found to 
connect ethical judgments to punishing behavior more strongly 
when they are focused upon a person, i.e., their supervisor, than 
upon an entity, i.e., their company. In the case of the supervisor, 
the beta weight reflecting the strength of the connection to 
punishing behavior was -.22, while for the company it was -.09. 
The numbers can be compared to each other, or to the strength of 
the influence of incentives/sanctions and/or the degree of 
monitoring. Either comparison suggests that ethics matter more in 
the case of a supervisor. 
 
Table 2.  Judgments of ethicality and willingness to defer. 
 
 Follow company 
rules and policies 
Follow 
supervisor’s 
decisions 
 
Ethics of company conduct .12*** — 
Ethics of supervisor’s conduct — .22*** 
Incentives/sanctions .01 .02 
Monitoring .34*** .30*** 
Adjusted R.-sq 13%*** 14%*** 
 
Table 3.  Judgments of ethicality and undermining actions by 
employees. 
 
 Hurt 
both 
Hurt 
company 
Hurt 
supervisor 
 
Ethics of company conduct -.13*** -.09*** — 
Ethics of supervisor’s 
conduct 
-.14*** — -.22*** 
Degree of 
incentives/sanctions 
-.02 0.00 -.01 
Probability of gain/loss 
(monitoring) 
-.14* -.14*** -.07*** 
Adjusted R.-sq 6%*** 3%*** 5% 
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So, although the impact of ethical conduct upon legitimacy 
judgments is similar for both supervisors and one’s company, 
ethical judgments shape people’s behavior toward the wrongdoer 
differently depending upon whether it is a person or an entity. 
Entities do not suffer as much from inferences of unethical conduct 
and, conversely, do not benefit as much from inferences of ethical 
conduct. 
E. Extension to Another Realm of Authority: Policing and the 
Police 
Both of the employee studies show that people more strongly 
link evaluations of conduct to motive inferences when they are 
dealing with a person. We suggest this occurs because people’s 
judgments about entities are less strongly based upon motive 
inferences. A direct examination of the factors shaping ethical 
judgments supports this perspective by showing that inferences 
about motivations are more central to evaluations of people. 
This latter point is key because it suggests that people link their 
evaluations of people to the motive inferences we have already 
discussed. As a consequence, it is easy to use such inferences to 
shape blame and punishment. In the case of entities, people have a 
model of ethics that does not fit well with issues of culpability and 
punishment because it is less centrally focused upon people’s 
motivation and character. Instead, in the case of employees, a key 
antecedent of corporate lack of ethics lies in ignoring people’s 
rights. While ignoring rights and failing to treat people with 
dignity are harms, they fit less clearly into a traditional model of 
culpability, blame, and punishment. 
What about in the legal arena? Do we see the same pattern? To 
test for this possibility we examined the results of a study of the 
residents of New York City. The sample was asked to make 
evaluations of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”). A 
random sample of the residents of the city evaluated the police in 
general. Within that sample, a smaller group with recent personal 
experiences evaluated the police officer(s) with whom they had 
dealt. The key question is what factors people consider when 
evaluating the NYPD as an entity as opposed to evaluating 
particular individuals in the NYPD. Put another way, how do 
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institutional evaluations differ from personal evaluations? 
The results, shown in Tables 4 and 5, provide strong support 
for the distinction found in the study of employees. When residents 
are reacting to the entity or institution of the NYPD they consider 
neutrality and respect for people/rights as the primary factors 
shaping their overall evaluations of those entities. In contrast, 
when they are reacting to a police officer with whom they have 
personally dealt, residents consider inferences about the motives of 
that person more than any other factor. In other words, as we found 
with employees, inferences about the police officer’s character and 
motivations are central to the resident’s reaction when the person is 
involved personally with a police officer.   
 
Table 4.  Factors shaping institution level willingness to defer 
to the police. 
 
Institutional trust Legitimacy of the 
police 
force 
Institutional trust in 
the police 
 Neutrality of the 
police 
.28*** .32*** 
 Respect for 
people/rights 
.16** .27*** 
 Motive inferences -.04 .06 
 Control over 
decisions 
.06 .09* 
 Adj. R.-sq. 18% 45% 
 
Table 5.  Factors shaping personal level willingness to defer to 
the police. 
 
 Willing to 
accept 
decision 
Complain to 
get decisions 
changed 
Neutrality of police officer .18*** -.24* 
Respect for person/rights .06 -.03 
Motive inferences .58*** -.26* 
Control over decision .10* .05 
Adj. R.-sq. 70% 21% 
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F. Direct Examination of the Question: How will a 
Corporation and Individuals within a Corporation be 
Judged for Identical Wrongdoings? 
The studies described above provide strong evidence regarding 
how people perceive and interpret ethical behavior in real life 
settings. They do not, however, provide causal evidence to the 
question at hand. It is possible, for example, that supervisor level 
and company level judgments of the lack of ethicality or of 
unfairness influence differently the personal outcomes of 
employees. A supervisor’s unfairness can more directly impact an 
employee’s working life, and therefore such unfairness is likely to 
negatively impact an employee’s cooperation. Also the studies we 
described here do not provide direct evidence to whether the 
identity of the wrongdoer itself, i.e., identification as a person or a 
corporation, affects the ethical interpretation of an identical action.  
To address these concerns we conducted an experiment in 
which we looked into people’s reaction to an identical description 
of an act of wrongdoing that was conducted either by a person or a 
company. Of course, we also acknowledge that in this experiment, 
unlike in the surveys, the people doing the judging are outsiders. 
This approach is more like the juror judgment approach used by 
Hans.67 
We claim that organizations are not a convenient target for 
moral judgments. People are better at seeing individuals as moral 
agents and therefore they are less sensitive to misconduct 
committed by a corporation than misconduct committed by a 
person. However the fact that moral principles apply less to 
organizations than to people does not only mean punishing them 
less. It can also mean that groups and organization will not be 
given the same ethical treatment or the same rights, or more 
generally not be as easily given the things associated with being a 
person, irrespective of whether those things are good (rights) or 
bad (responsibilities).   
To test these hypotheses we looked at how people react to a 
study that presents misconduct—a discriminatory behavior in 
workforce—committed by either a supervisor or a corporation. We 
                                                          
67 See supra Part IV. 
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also looked at how people react to the denial of protected rights—
in this case a deprivation of the right to speech—directed towards 
either company employees or toward the company itself. We 
measured how people perceive and react to such scenarios. 
In the first study, the participants68 read a newspaper article 
describing a company, or a supervisor that consistently refused to 
hire women. The descriptions of the alleged discrimination as well 
as other descriptions of the case were kept identical and we only 
varied the identity of the wrongdoer as being either a corporation 
or a supervisor. After reading the article, participants were asked 
whether they agree or disagree with the claim that the company’s 
or supervisor’s behavior was discriminatory, or that this behavior 
was permissible (reversely coded) on a scale ranging from 1 
“strongly agree” to 7 “strongly disagree.” Our results show that 
participants viewed the same behavior as more discriminatory 
when it was conducted by a supervisor (M=2.44, SD=0.94), rather 
than by a company ((M=3.40, SD=1.34), t(33)=2.47 p<0.05). We 
also asked participants how severe the punishment should be for 
this misconduct on a scale ranging from 1 “not at all severe” to 7 
“very severe.” The results showed that participants thought that the 
punishment should be harsher for the same behavior when it was 
conducted by a supervisor (M=3.44, SD=2.10) rather than by a 
company (M=2.40, SD=1.06).69 
In the second study, we gave participants a newspaper article to 
read which contained an article about the city council preventing 
the corporation or the corporation’s employees from protesting 
against a new tax that was enacted on the corporation. We asked 
participants how much they “agree or disagree” that the city should 
be allowed to prevent the corporation/employees from protesting, 
and that the right to protest should have been expanded to the 
company/employees in this case. The questions were administrated 
on a scale ranging from 1 “strongly agree” to 7 “strongly 
                                                          
68 The participants were people recruited on the NYU campus. They 
included both students and other members of the University community. Each 
was approached and asked to complete a brief scenario based study. See Tom R. 
Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Survey on Misconduct by Either Supervisor or 
Corporation (Summer 2010, study on file with authors). 
69 This difference is marginally statistically significant at t(33)=1.82, 
p=0.08. 
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disagree.” The results showed that participants viewed the denial 
of protest rights to the employees as a more negative outcome 
(M=1.78, SD=1.00) than a similar denial to the company 
((M=2.63, SD=1.58), t(32)=2.06, p<0.05). 
The results of these studies demonstrate that people did not 
hold companies as morally responsible for unethical conduct as 
individuals, and conversely, they did not see them as equally 
deserving of similar legal protection for their rights, in this case the 
right to speak. The fact that people failed both to punish 
organizations and to give them rights supports our initial thesis that 
organizations are not perceived as full moral agents in the same 
way that people extend this model to individuals.  
These findings also show that people’s perception of moral 
deservingness contradicts the pervasive legal doctrine, which 
deems corporations as equally worthy of the protection of many 
constitutional rights. Our findings suggest that people view 
individuals as much more deserving of both credit and blame for 
moral acts. 
CONCLUSION 
The topic of this symposium is quite broad. It is about the law 
and morality of punishing collective entities. Our concern is with 
one aspect of this broad question: how people conceptualize 
responsibility and blame on the personal and organizational level. 
And, our focus is on the people within an organization who deal 
both with the organization and its policies and practices, and with 
the authorities within that organization who make decisions and 
implement policies.   
Our results suggest that people think about responsibility 
differently at the individual level and at the organizational level. In 
particular, they focus predominantly upon issues of character when 
evaluating and reacting to individuals. But, they react to more 
abstract procedural issues when dealing with entities. This suggests 
that people have trouble putting organizational conduct into the 
person-focused models through which culpability and punishment 
are typically evaluated.   
Hans argues that people view corporations as more 
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professional.70 These findings support that characterization in that 
they suggest people focus more on abstract issues, such as the 
neutrality of decision making, when evaluating entities. When 
evaluating people, they focus more directly upon motive inferences 
and character judgments.   
What are the implications of these findings? Our results 
suggest that people are more capable of judging the conduct of 
individuals than organizations. Similarly, an identical 
organizational policy (in our case, gender discrimination in hiring) 
raised greater moral condemnation when it was executed by a 
person (the supervisor) rather than by the company. Therefore, if 
organizations personalized the policies and revealed the 
individuals behind their decisions, people would be more inclined 
and better able to morally evaluate such conduct. Since people are 
better in judging the responsibility of individuals, organizations 
interested in promoting accountability for conduct need to be more 
transparent with respect to the people behind the decision making 
and the policies in the organizations instead of presenting people, 
insiders or outsiders, with abstract entities they cannot morally 
evaluate.   
While these findings suggest that it is easier to evaluate 
responsibility for individuals, they also suggest that people are 
willing to be more flexible and discretionary in their understanding 
of the actions of individuals. Judging the motives of a person 
allows them flexibility to depart from rules, and shape actions to 
particular circumstances, as long as people believe that their 
motivations for doing so are benevolent. In other words, 
individuals have more flexibility to enact particularized solutions 
to problems, since they are judged based upon their intentions. 
Organizations are judged based upon the neutrality of their rules 
and their recognition of rights. This suggests less flexibility for 
them to change what they do in particular situations. 
Hence, overall our findings suggest a tradeoff. On the one 
hand, an individual’s actions can be more easily understood in 
moral terms, so individuals are more likely to be judged morally 
responsible for something that they do. On the other hand, because 
individuals are judged in terms of character and intention they have 
                                                          
70 HANS, supra note 4, at 122. 
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greater freedom to depart from formal rules and policies, as long as 
their intentions in so doing are viewed as benevolent.   
 
